Research
I work primarily on issues within normative ethics, animal ethics, and environmental ethics. My current research projects focus broadly on two issues: 1) our partial moral responsibilities to animals; and 2) environmental justice. Regarding both projects, I draw heavily upon philosophy, but also aim to take an interdisciplinary approach through incorporation of relevant literature from fields outside philosophy, such as veterinary science and policy making.
Partiality and Animal Ethics:
What are our partial moral responsibilities to animals? In my dissertation, I argue that the special relationships are morally meaningful and that they generate certain moral responsibilities. Further, I argue that humans and, at least some, non-human animals can enter into special relationships with each other. Using animal companions as an illustration, I argue that animal companion caregivers take on robust moral responsibilities directed at their animal companions, similar to the moral responsibilities a parent takes on toward their child.
Environmental Justice:
As part of the Environmental Justice Thriving Communities Technical Assistance Centers program (EJ TCTACs), I explore issues related to environmental justice. While philosophers have a rich and diverse history of addressing theoretical issues of environmental ethics and environmental justice, specifically, relatively little has been said about how to understand environmental justice communities, including their unique contributions to policy making. As such, one of the primary aims of this research project is to examine the role of environmental justice communities in environmental justice through a distinctly philosophical lens that also aims to address practical concerns.
Below you can find a list of publications and papers in progress or under review. To request a paper draft, contact me through the Contact page.
Publications:
What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists.
In Progress or Under Review:
“What is an Animal Companion? Revisiting the Barnbaum-Varner Definition”
Many animal ethicists have shifted from using the term ‘pet’ to the term ‘animal companion’, but what exactly is an animal companion? Arguably, the most comprehensive description of what an animal companion is comes from Gary Varner who builds upon the work of Deborah Barnbaum. I examine what I call the Barnbaum-Varner definition of ‘animal companion’. I suggest that while the definition mostly captures what we think of when we think of an animal companion, there are potential philosophical issues which may impede constructive use of this definition. I offer a revised version of the Barnbaum-Varner definition to avoid these issues.
“Taking Partiality Seriously: Extending Partiality to Non-Human Animals”
I suggest that there are intuitive reasons to accept the notion that morality permits and sometimes requires us to favor the interests of our intimates. Such favoring is often characterized in terms of the ethics of partiality. Philosophers who take the ethics of partiality seriously tend to justify partiality along three potential choice points: our projects, our relationships with others, and the value of individuals. However, most philosophers who take the ethics of partiality seriously often focus on how these justificatory points imply moral commitments to other humans. In this paper, I explore the underexamined question of whether partial moral concern can be extended to non-human animals. I suggest that regardless of the justification for the ethics of partiality, partial moral consideration can be extended to non-human animals. However, the partial moral consideration extended to animals will depend on what justifies partial moral consideration in the first place. After developing the core of my argument, I address a primary objection to my position: that having partial moral commitments to animals is wildly unintuitive and an indication of moral reasoning gone astray. I suggest that this objection only has force if one holds that non-human animals have either no moral status or significantly reduced moral status comparable to humans.
“Neo-Aristotelian Friendship and Non-Human Animals: Can I be Friends with my Dog?”