Research
I work primarily on issues within normative ethics, animal ethics, and environmental ethics. My current research projects focus broadly on two issues: 1) our partial moral responsibilities to animals; and 2) environmental justice. Regarding both projects, I draw heavily upon philosophy, but also aim to take an interdisciplinary approach through incorporation of relevant literature from fields outside philosophy, such as veterinary science, political theory, and sociology.
Partiality and Animal Ethics:
What are our partial moral responsibilities to animals? In my dissertation, I argue that the special relationships are morally meaningful and that they generate certain moral responsibilities. Further, I argue that humans and, at least some, non-human animals can enter into special relationships with each other. Using animal companions as an illustration, I argue that animal companion caregivers take on robust moral responsibilities directed at their animal companions, similar to the moral responsibilities a parent takes on toward their child.
Environmental Justice:
While philosophers have a rich and diverse history of addressing theoretical issues of environmental ethics and environmental justice, specifically, relatively little has been said about how to understand environmental justice communities (e.g. those communities designated by federal or state governments as being the appropriate targets of government aid in addressing environmental issues), including their unique contributions to policy making. As such, one of the primary aims of this research project is to examine the role of environmental justice communities in environmental justice through a distinctly philosophical lens that also aims to address practical concerns of those communities, policy implementation, and government oversight.
Below you can find a list of publications and papers in progress or under review. To request a paper draft, please contact me through the Contact page.
Publications:
“What is an Animal Companion? Revisiting the Barnbaum-Varner Definition”, Journal of Animal Ethics, (forthcoming).
Many animal ethicists have shifted from using the term ‘pet’ to the term ‘animal companion’, but what exactly is an animal companion? Arguably, the most comprehensive description of what an animal companion is comes from Gary Varner who builds upon the work of Deborah Barnbaum. I examine what I call the Barnbaum-Varner definition of ‘animal companion’. I suggest that while the definition mostly captures what we think of when we think of an animal companion, there are potential philosophical issues which may impede constructive use of this definition. I offer a revised version of the Barnbaum-Varner definition to avoid these issues.
No abstract.
What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists.
In Progress or Under Review:
“Extending Moral Partiality to Non-Human Animals”
Philosophers who take the ethics of partiality seriously tend to justify moral partiality along three potential choice points: our projects, our relationships with others, and the value of individuals. Within this literature, much of the concern focuses on how the ethics of partiality relates to our moral responsibilities to other humans. In this paper, I explore the underexamined question of whether moral partiality can be extended to non-human animals. I suggest that moral partiality can be extended to non-human animals on each of the three prominent approaches examined. After developing the core of my argument, I address a primary objection to my position: that extending moral partiality to animals is wildly unintuitive and an indication of moral reasoning gone astray. I suggest that this objection only has force if one holds that non-human animals have either no moral status or significantly reduced moral status comparable to humans.
“Neo-Aristotelian Friendship and Non-Human Animals: Can I be Friends with my Dog?”
“A dog is man’s best friend” is a well-known and widely used phrase, but are we right in thinking that dogs are our friends? If so, do we owe our dogs what we owe our friends? Aristotle recognized three different kinds of friends: friends of utility, friends of pleasure, and friends of virtue. I suggest that dogs can meet the conditions necessary for entering into the first two kinds of friendship, but that there is a potential moral hazard in thinking about our relationship with dogs in these terms. It is unclear whether dogs can meet the more stringent conditions necessary to enter friendships of virtue. Furthermore, the moral responsibilities that animal companion caregivers take on appear to be different than those of friendship. For these reasons, I challenge the notion that a neo-Aristotelian conception of friendship best captures the relationship we have with dogs.
“Defining Environmental Justice Communties: The Ethical Basis for Environmental Justice Policy” (co-written with Matthew Kisner)