Research
I work primarily on issues within normative ethics, animal ethics, and environmental ethics. My current research projects focus broadly on two issues: 1) our partial moral responsibilities to animals; and 2) environmental justice. Regarding both projects, I take an interdisciplinary approach, drawing heavily upon philosophy, but also relevant fields outside philosophy, such as veterinary science, political theory, and sociology.
Partiality and Animal Ethics:
My work in animal ethics focuses on moral partiality, which is the notion that we have special permissions or obligations to certain individuals. Moral partiality has historically been developed in a human-human context. I suggest that, in principle and practice, this view can be extended to a human-animal context. While I believe moral partiality extends to a wide range of animals, my current work focuses primarily on animal companions, especially dogs. My work has been published in venues such as the Journal of Animal Ethics and the Journal of Value Inquiry. I have presented work on animal ethics to professional philosophical audiences at the APA 2025 Central Division Meeting, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, and the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals.
Environmental Justice:
While philosophers have a rich and diverse history of addressing theoretical issues of environmental ethics and environmental justice, specifically, relatively little has been said about how to understand environmental justice communities (e.g. those communities designated by federal or state governments as being the appropriate targets of government aid in addressing environmental issues), including their unique contributions to policy making. As such, one of the primary aims of this research project is an examination environmental justice communities and their relation to environmental ethics through a distinctly philosophical lens. My co-researcher on this project is Dr. Matthew Kisner from the University of South Carolina. Our recent presentations include presenting work on embedding ethicists within environmental practice at the APA 2025 Central Division Meeting and work on defining environmental justice communities for use in policy at the APA 2025 Pacific Division Meeting.
Below you can find a list of publications and papers in progress or under review. To request a paper draft, please contact me through the Contact page.
Publications:
“A dog is man’s best friend” is a well-known and widely used phrase, but are we right in thinking that dogs are our friends? If so, do we owe our dogs what we owe our friends? Aristotle recognized three different kinds of friends: friends of utility, friends of pleasure, and friends of virtue. I suggest that dogs can meet the conditions necessary for entering into the first two kinds of friendship, but that there is a potential moral hazard in thinking about our relationship with dogs in these terms. It is unclear whether dogs can meet the more stringent conditions necessary to enter friendships of virtue. Furthermore, the moral responsibilities that animal companion caregivers take on appear to be different than those of friendship. For these reasons, I challenge the notion that a neo-Aristotelian conception of friendship best captures the relationship we have with dogs.
Many animal ethicists have shifted from using the term ‘pet’ to the term ‘animal companion’, but what exactly is an animal companion? Arguably, the most comprehensive description of what an animal companion is comes from Gary Varner who builds upon the work of Deborah Barnbaum. I examine what I call the Barnbaum-Varner definition of ‘animal companion’. I suggest that while the definition mostly captures what we think of when we think of an animal companion, there are potential philosophical issues which may impede constructive use of this definition. I offer a revised version of the Barnbaum-Varner definition to avoid these issues.
No abstract.
What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists.
Works-In-Progress and Under Review:
“Extending Moral Partiality to Non-Human Animals”
Philosophers who take the ethics of partiality seriously tend to justify moral partiality along three potential choice points: our projects, our relationships with others, and the value of individuals. Within this literature, much of the concern focuses on how the ethics of partiality relates to our moral responsibilities to other humans. In this paper, I explore the underexamined question of whether moral partiality can be extended to non-human animals. I suggest that moral partiality can be extended to non-human animals on each of the three prominent approaches examined. After developing the core of my argument, I address a primary objection to my position: that extending moral partiality to animals is wildly unintuitive and an indication of moral reasoning gone astray. I suggest that this objection only has force if one holds that non-human animals have either no moral status or significantly reduced moral status comparable to humans.
“Defining Environmental Justice Communties: The Ethical Basis for Environmental Justice Policy” (co-written with Matthew Kisner)